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LESSONS FROM THE US EXPERIENCE ON INDUCING HIGHWAY 
CONCESSION CONTRACTS 
  
Yuji NAKAMURA *, Yutaka HIRASHIMA** 
Researcher, the University of Tokyo* 
ISS Inc.** 
 
 
ABSTRACT: PPP projects, more specifically Concession Contracts, are getting more and more prevalent in 
the US recently. A report by U.S. PIRG Education Fund in 2009 said that between 1994 and 2008, 58 
highway facilities had been delivered under PPP models and/or concession contracts. However, swift growth 
of the concession contracts such as long term lease and DBFO has generated fierce criticism from a 
standpoint of protecting the public interests. This paper attempts to examine lessons from the US cases on 
highway concession contracts that revealed public policy issues, establish a “double bottom line” to fulfill 
both public interests and private returns of the project and evaluate five (5) US concession contracts in 
accordance with the eight (8) key indicators regarding if each contract is in favor of either public or private. 
Finally, the key indicators are scored between 0.0 pt and 1.0 pt and the total score is defined as 
Public-Private Index (PPI).  
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1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES  
 
Approximately one and half decades ago, the US 
commenced to study concession contracts carried out 
in Europe. As a consequence, concession contracts 
as represented by Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll 
Road are rapidly getting prevalent in the US. On the 
other hand, various issues became evident due to 
swift growth of concession contracts. These issues 
involve the concessionaire bankruptcies and 
resulting ceased road services, or the rate of return 
by the concessionaire was criticized to be too high. 
 
In order to provide stable road services, it is 
necessary for the concessionaire to make appropriate 
returns, however, excessive returns will excite 
criticism from a standpoint of protecting public 
interests. As delineated hereafter, some evidence 
indicates that a balance between the private returns 
and public interests is indispensable so that 
stakeholders like public sectors, concessionaires, 
lenders/investors, and users/community are satisfied 
with the project. 
 
This paper contributes to establishing a “double 
bottom line” to fulfill both the private returns and 
public interests of the project. Chapter 2 examines 
typical contract terms and conditions by analyzing 
existing concession contracts in the US and attempts 
to enumerate eight (8) key indicators which may 
remarkably affect the above double bottom line. 
Chapter 3 provides examples and events of current 
concession contracts, clarifies commonly prevailing 
practice and evaluation of related terms of contracts 
and sets up a basis of evaluation for each key 
indicator. In Chapter 4, five (5) US concession 
contracts are conclusively scored in accordance with 
the eight (8) key indicators and evaluated according 
to the double bottom line that measures if the 
contract is in favor of either public or private.  
 
Numerous academic papers, reports to the 
Governmental Authorities, books and journals 
regarding public interest issues of concession 
contracts have been published. Some of them are 
listed in the Reference of this paper and include the 
following discussions: (i) stiff opposition for the 
Indiana Toll Road and a moratorium on new 
concessions imposed by the legislature in Texas 
(Oritz 2008), (ii) characterizing PPP Program 
Drivers (Garvin 2008), (iii) revenue sharing 
provisions and other concession features that affect 
private returns (Mayer 2007), (iv) how 
decision-makers should know whether they are 
advancing the public interest (Baxbaum 2007), (v) 
demand risk-sharing scheme defined by the 
accumulated present value of the revenue (Vassallo 
2009). This paper is the first to attempt to evaluate 
concession contracts from a standpoint of both private 
returns and public interests. 
 
2. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES ON 
CONCESSION CONTRACTS  
– From a Standpoint of Private Returns versus 
Public Interests 
 
2.1 Methodology to Identify Key Indicators for 
Public Policy Issues 
Public policy issues on concession contracts from a 
standpoint of private returns versus public interests 
will be discussed. A three-step methodology as 
described hereinafter shall be adopted to identify key 
indicators that are influential on the above issues. 
 
Step 1: First, commonly applicable terms and 
conditions extracted from such real concession 
contracts as Dulles Greenway (Virginia 1993), SR91 
Express Lanes (California 1993), Camino Colombia 
Bypass (Texas 1999), SR125 (California 2003), 
Chicago Skyway (Illinois 2005), Indiana Toll Road 
(Indiana 2006), Pocahontas Parkway (Virginia 2006), 
SH-130 5&6 (Texas 2008), I-495 HOT Lanes 
(Virginia 2008) and I-595 Managed Lanes (Florida 
2009) shall be listed as “common terms and 
conditions”. 
  
Step 2: These contractual terms and conditions 
shall be evaluated by four (4) tiers intensity 
regarding influence on the double bottom line of 
private returns or public interests. Evaluation by the 
four (4) tiers intensity shall be made in the following 
manner; 
 
(Intensity A): Those terms and conditions that 
vary by the Contract and where difference of 
substances would affect the double bottom line. For 
example, relating to rate of return by the 
concessionaire, some contracts stipulate the cap rate 
and others do not. This largely affects the 
concessionaire’s returns.  
 
(Intensity B): Those terms and conditions that 
imply no major difference of contractual substances 
and do not affect contract characteristics. However, 
they need to be taken into consideration when 
evaluating the double bottom line. For example, the 
term relating to force majeure regulates that 
concessionaires are exempted from indemnity and 
public sectors assume responsibility. This is regarded 
as favorable to the concessionaire. 
 
(Intensity C): Those terms and conditions of 
which substance are decided at a previous phase of 
the bid and/or contract processes, or at a later phase 
when the corresponding cases happen during the 
Project proceeding and are accordingly independent 
Table 1 common terms and conditions / their intensity 
Common Terms & Conditions Intensity Remarks
toll rate and reasonable future toll rates A cap rates are highly influential
reasonable rate of return by concessio-
naires and income sharing with public sector
A cap rates and revenue sharing are highly influential
concession term A concession length is highly influential
competing facilities A revenue impaction facilities are highly influential
force majeure B
most contracts stipulate public responsibility
→ private-favored
change in superior policy and law B
most contracts stipulate public responsibility
→ private-favored
renegotiation C determined upon cases
refinance C determined upon cases
default or bankrupt of concessionaires C determined upon cases
quality of long term maintenance and operation B most contracts have standards → public-favored
hand-back and/or resale B most contracts have standards → public-favored
compliance with environmental standards C predetermined before contract
transaction of upfront or annual proceeds D not affect public- or private-favored characteristics
construction, completion date D not affect public- or private-favored characteristics
insurance, indemnity D not affect public- or private-favored characteristics
records D not affect public- or private-favored characteristics
tax D not affect public- or private-favored characteristics
subsidies C predetermined before contract
compliance of laws D not affect public- or private-favored characteristics  
 
from evaluating the double bottom line at the time of 
contracts. For example, application of subsidies is 
determined prior to the bid announcement and 
incorporated into the financial scheme before the 
bid. 
 
(Intensity D): Those terms and conditions that 
do not directly influence the evaluation of the double 
bottom line. For example, the use of upfront 
payment is important public decision but does not 
directly relate to the double bottom line if it is either 
public- or private-favored. 
 
Step 3: Based upon Steps 1 and 2, items ranked 
as Intensity A and B shall be identified as “Key 
Indicators” to consider the double bottom line if 
contracts are either private- or public-favored. 
 
2.2 Identification of Key Indicators 
Nineteen (19) commonly applicable contractual 
terms and conditions are extracted in accordance 
with Step 1 as described above. Then, they are 
ranked as intensity A, B, C and D in accordance with 
Step 2 above. As a result, four (4) of the Intensity A 
items and four (4) of the Intensity B items are 
identified as Key Indicators of the double bottom 
line for public policy issues and are to be evaluated 
later on. Table 1 shows all of the extracted contract 
terms and conditions and their intensity tier. 
 
3. COMMONLY PREVAILING PRACTICE 
AND EVALUATION OF RELATED TERMS OF 
CONTRACTS 
 
In this Chapter, discussion is focused on the eight (8) 
key indicators out of the nineteen (19) common 
terms and conditions as listed in Table 1. Items other 
than the eight (8) key indicators are excluded since 
they are not so intensively correlated in sight of the 
double bottom line. 
 
First, a literature survey is carried out regarding 
how each of the eight (8) key indicators is specified 
in current contracts and then the commonly 
prevailing practice that stipulates common ground of 
existing concession contracts. Prominent examples 
of the contracts and remarkable events to be 
considered are also described. 
 
Second, a basis of evaluation to deliberate if the 
practice commonly prevailed is favorable to public 
interests or private returns is examined or proposed.  
 
3.1 Toll Rate and Reasonable Future Toll Rates 
 
3.1.1 Examples and Events 
-- Chicago Skyway sets rates until 2017, then 
indexed rate may be increased to the greater of 2%, 
the % increase in Consumer Price Index (CPI) or 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. 
(Schedule 6 of the Contract) 
-- Indiana Toll Road sets rates until 2011, then 
indexed rate may be increased to the greater of 2%, 
the % increase in CPI or per capita GDP. (Schedule 
7.1 of the Contract) 
-- Pocahontas Parkway sets rates until 2017, then 
indexed rate may be increased to the greater of 2.8%, 
the % increase in CPI or per capita GDP. (Article 4, 
Exhibit F of the Contract) 
-- One (1) early project in 1993, the Dulles 
Greenway in Virginia, was developed under the state 
legislation that mandated utility-style toll-rate 
regulation. However, in April 2008, toll rate 
increases from 2013 to 2020 were linked to the 
greater of (i) the increase in CPI from the last toll 
rate increase plus 1%, (ii) the increase in the real 
GDP from the last toll rate increase, or (iii) 2.8%. 
(Regulated by SCC under VA. Code Ann.56-542 
(2007)) 
-- I-495 HOT Lanes adopt Congestion Pricing, 
including the dynamic tolling that enables frequent 
toll rate changes in order to maintain smooth traffic 
flow. (Section 4.04 and 12.02 of Amended and 
Restated Comprehensive Agreement). 
 
3.1.2 Commonly Prevailing Practice   
All recent agreements for operation of existing or 
newly constructed toll roads have included 
limitations on how often and how much toll rates 
could be increased. In most projects, the mechanisms 
used to control toll rates consist of specific 
limitations on rate increases. Indexed rate may be 
linked to economic indices such as CPI and GDP or 
the set rates. Upon the Contract, toll rates are 
proposed by the concessionaire on a basis of the cap 
rate stipulated in the bidding requirements and 
determined as agreed. 
 
Reasonable toll rates would include variable toll 
rates set high enough in peak periods to efficiently 
manage congestion. Concessionaires must be able to 
project that future toll revenues will be sufficient to 
retire debt, pay for the costs of operation, 
maintenance and future capital improvements, and 
provide a reasonable return to investors. 
 
From an economic perspective, toll rates should 
approach the marginal societal cost of driving. 
 
For congested facilities, setting maximum fixed 
toll rates will likely to be in conflict with a desire to 
minimize congestion through variable pricing. For 
these projects, limiting returns on equity or 
providing for revenue sharing has been used in lieu 
of rate caps to protect against monopoly profits. 
 
3.1.3 A Basis of Evaluation 
When public sectors attempt to link toll rates with 
economic indices such as CPI and per capita GDP 
and set cap rates not to excessively raise the toll, 
such contracts are evaluated as favorable to public 
interests. Oppositely, if contracts allow 
concessionaires to conduct monopoly pricing, such 
contracts are evaluated as favorable to private 
returns. 
 
3.2 Reasonable Rate of Return by 
Concessionaires and Income Sharing with Public 
Sector 
 
3.2.1 Examples and Events 
-- Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road provide 
no rate of return limitation and revenue sharing 
though toll rates are capped. The rate of return limit 
is placed by competition bid based on highest 
upfront payment.  
-- Pocahontas Parkway (Section 5.01), SH-130 5&6 
(Section 5.1.2, Exhibit 7, Part B) and I-495 HOT 
Lanes (Section 5.01, Exhibit L) provide revenue 
sharing based on levels of return on total investment. 
Once the concessionaire has achieved a certain rate 
of return, the private and public partners will share 
additional revenue.  
-- An example of thresholds stipulated in the 
Contract of Pocahontas Parkway is that (i) if the 
pre-tax internal rate of return on total invested 
project funds exceeds 6.5% during the first period, 
the concessionaire must pay the public sector 40% of 
the gross toll revenues, and (ii) if it exceeds 8%, the 
concessionaire must pay 80% of the gross toll 
revenues to the public sector.  
 
3.2.2 Commonly Prevailing Practice 
The approach public officials use to address rate of 
return limitations depends on a number of factors, 
including (i) the net benefits to the society, (ii) the 
policy objectives of the public sector, (iii) the risk 
profile of the project, and (iv) the competitive nature 
of the procurement. The concessionaire’s return can 
be restricted through contractual provisions that cap 
the amount of user fees. 
 
There are four (4) other approaches that have 
been used to limit returns in toll road concessions: (i) 
competitive bidding, (ii) revenue sharing, (iii) 
absolute caps on rate of return, and (iv) utility-type 
rate regulation. 
 
In the Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road 
concessions, there was no explicit limit on rate of 
return. The actual rate of return will be a product of 
how efficiently the concessionaire can operate the 
toll road. However, analysis of the Indiana and 
Chicago deals by Dennis Enright (July 24, 2008) 
found that the private investors in those deals would 
likely recoup their investment in less than 20 years. 
 
Responding to the criticism as above, several 
agencies have opted for revenue sharing provisions 
that allow both the public sector and the 
concessionaire to share in the upside potential. 
 
Recent variations on revenue sharing provisions 
are (i) the use of pre-set revenue bands from which 
the public sector will be paid a certain percentage of 
revenues, (ii) no pre-set revenue bands is applied to 
until a certain period of the concession, after which, 
a certain rate of excessive revenue over the pre-set 
band will be returned to public sectors, and (iii) 
concession term is shortened at the determination by 
public sectors. 
 
3.2.3 A Basis of Evaluation  
If the concession contracts regulate revenue sharing 
provisions, such contracts are deemed favorable to 
public interests. If no such provisions are regulated, 
such contracts are deemed favorable to private 
returns. 
 
3.3 Concession Term 
 
3.3.1 Examples and Events 
-- Concession term of Dulles Greenway, one of the 
early (1993) contract, was originally 40 years, but in 
2001 it was extended for additional 20 years because 
decreasing traffic demand necessitated re-financing. 
-- 99 years for Chicago Skyway and Pocahontas and 
75 years for Indiana Toll Road are the examples of 
long term concessions. 
-- Some States have capped the maximum term of 
agreements by legislation. Examples of maximum 
terms imposed by states are 35 years in California, 
99 years in Colorado, and 50 years in other states. 
 
3.3.2 Commonly Prevailing Practice 
One important policy consideration in setting 
contract terms is the level of risk of the project. 
However, other policy considerations such as 
incentives to innovate, overall impact on government 
budgets and governmental capability and desire to 
operate various transportation assets are also 
important. Concessionaires need a longer concession 
period to allow them to recover their costs and to 
achieve a reasonable return on investment. 
 
Certain Federal, State and local tax 
consideration, such as the ability to qualify for 
accelerated depreciation, are also factored into the 
length of the term. Tax ownership qualifies the 
concessionaire to depreciate the portion of its 
upfront payment allocated to the tangible physical 
assets over 15 years for a highway. As for Federal 
corporate income tax, a concession deal of more than 
45 years can be deemed to be a sale even though 
ownership remains in public sectors.  
 
Oppositely, a long term lease contract raises 
some problems to be brought over the next 
generation. In the example case of Chicago Skyway, 
there is a concern if anticipated increase in toll rate 
can consist with a fair contract over future 
generations. Accordingly, it can be assumed that an 
option to the hold the right of shortening the 
concession term due to protection of public interests 
is regulated. In fact, there is such a concession 
contract realized in France. 
 
3.3.3 A Basis of Evaluation 
The concession term implemented currently vary 
from 35 to 99 years by States and by Contracts. It 
shall be evaluated that the contract allowing the term 
99 years is most favorable to private returns and the 
contract allowing the term 35 years is most favorable 
to public interests. 
 
3.4 Revenue Impacting Competing Facilities 
 
3.4.1 Examples and Events 
-- Camino Colombia Toll Road, located in Texas, 
first opened to traffic in 2000, completely financed 
by private investors at a cost of $90 million. An 
independent auditor predicted that Camino Colombia 
road would generate $9 million in revenue within the 
first year, but instead it only received $500,000. By 
2004, the toll road had failed and bondholders 
foreclosed on the remaining $75 million note. The 
road was sold at an auction for $12.1 million to John 
Hancock Financial Services Inc. After purchasing 
the road, John Hancock immediately closed the road 
to all traffic. This move forced Texas DOT to pay the 
private company $20 million to purchase the road, 
allowing it finally reopen after five months. 
 
3.4.2 Commonly Prevailing Practice 
Public sectors need to be free to invest in new 
infrastructure in the future to meet actual growth. 
Current contracts do not specifically prohibit public 
sectors from building what have been termed 
“competing facilities”. Only the SR 91 express lanes 
prohibited construction of competing facilities. 
Current agreements provide for possible 
compensation to be paid to the concessionaire if any 
construction of facilities not planned when the 
agreement was executed results in a proven 
reduction in revenue. 
 
3.4.3 A Basis of Evaluation 
Non-compete and compensation provisions are to be 
considered protecting the concessionaire’s returns. 
Accordingly, the contract containing these provisions 
is deemed favorable to private returns and the 
contract with no such provisions are deemed 
favorable to public interests. 
 
3.5 Force Majeure 
 
3.5.1 Examples and Events 
-- The State of Indiana compensated the 
concessionaire $447,000 of losses due to flood 
evacuation occurred on Indiana Toll Road in 
September 2008. 
 
3.5.2 Commonly Prevailing Practice and a Basis 
of Evaluation 
Contracts stipulating indemnity restoration costs are 
deemed favorable to private returns. Most of the 
current concession contracts have this provision. In 
the case if no such indemnity is provided, then the 
contracts are deemed favorable to public interests. 
 
3.6 Changes in Superior Policy and Law 
 
3.6.1 Commonly Prevailing Practice  
Unplanned change of superior policy and law at the 
contract may occur due to public policy 
considerations. When it is the case, the public sector 
will exempt the concessionaire from damages due to 
the change and discuss with the concessionaire 
appropriate resolution including toll rate increases. 
Public sectors reserve the right to terminate the 
contract with fair value under the reason of public 
convenience as a result of change in superior policy. 
 
3.6.2 A Basis of Evaluation 
Contracts stipulating the measures against changes in 
superior policy or law are deemed favorable to private 
returns. In the case where no such provision is 
stipulated and risks due to such changes are transferred 
to the concessionaire, contracts are deemed favorable 
to public interests. 
 
3.7 Quality of Long Term Maintenance and 
Operation   
 
3.7.1 Commonly Prevailing Practice 
The concessionaire is expected to be highly 
motivated to maintain the facility in top condition in 
order to protect its investment and attract the greatest 
number of customers. 
 
Contract terms that incorporate these 
expectations with detailed performance requirements 
have become standard in concession transactions. 
Many contracts include schedules of improvements 
required from the concessionaire over the life of the 
agreement. Additional security for the 
concessionaire’s performance can be provided by 
requiring deposits to be made to reserves for 
operation, maintenance and rehabilitation ahead of 
distributions to equity investors. 
 
Usually, the concessionaire’s lenders also have 
a strong interest in policing the concessionaire and 
its maintenance of the facility in order to avoid any 
threat of contract termination due to the 
concessionaire’s default. 
 
3.7.2 A Basis of Evaluation 
Contracts requiring state-of-the-art performance 
levels are deemed favorable to public interests. 
Concessionaires have strong incentives to invest in 
high quality services but have limited amount to be 
spent. If contracts require standard good industry 
practice, they shall be deemed favorable to private 
returns. 
 
3.8 Hand-back and Resale 
 
3.8.1 Examples and Events 
-- Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road 
concessions both used letter of credit that would be 
available to the public sector if the concessionaire 
failed to return the facility in good condition. 
-- Pocahontas Parkway concession requires the 
concessionaire to maintain an “extraordinary 
maintenance reserve” to fund any necessary renewal 
or maintenance work required to put the project in 
good condition at the termination of the contract. 
-- SH-121, SH-130 and I-635 in Texas use detailed 
hand-back requirements to spell out what the 
condition of the facility must be at the end of the 
term. 
 
3.8.2 Commonly Prevailing Practice 
Toward the end of the term, the incentive for the 
concessionaires to invest in renewal work weakens. 
This could leave the public sector with significant 
operations and maintenance obligations at the 
termination of the contract. Hand-back provisions 
have three (3) main purposes: (i) they form part of 
the concession life-cycle approach, (ii) they help 
induce the concessionaire to maintain the facility 
throughout the term, and (iii) they add certainty as to 
the condition of the assets that will revert to the 
public sector at the end of the term. Letter of credit, 
performance bonds, cash deposits for maintenance 
reserves and annual audit are essential 
countermeasures. 
 
3.8.3 A Basis of Evaluation 
Contracts specifying hand-back provision and resale 
provision are evaluated favorable to public interests 
and contracts with no such provisions are evaluated 
favorable to private returns. 
 
4. ANALYSIS AND SCORING OF 
REPRESENTATIVE US CONTRACTS 
 
4.1 Methodology of Scoring 
To summarize and analyze the US concession 
contracts regarding the double bottom line if they are 
favorable to public interests or private returns, the 
five (5) projects of Chicago Skyway, Indiana Toll 
Road, Pocahontas Parkway, SH-130 5&6 and I-495 
HOT Lanes are scored in the following manners; 
 
(i) Analysis shall be made for individual item of the 
“eight (8) key indicators” as previously 
enumerated. 
(ii) Scoring shall be made in accordance with the 
“basis of evaluation” as previously discussed in 
the Chapter 3. 
(iii) If, in accordance with the basis of evaluation, the 
indicator is determined as favorable to private 
returns, then it shall be scored as 1.0 pt, while if 
the indicator is determined as favorable to public 
interests, then it shall be scored as 0.0 pt. 
(iv) All of the eight key indicators are thus scored 
either 1.0 pt or 0.0 pt, except the indicator of 
concession term that shall be differently scored. 
Table 2 analysis and scoring results of US concession contracts 
Favorable
to Public
Interests
（0.0pt）
Favorable
to Private
Returns
（1.0pt）
①toll rates set no caps
②rate of return by
concessionaires
capped no caps
③concession term 1.00 99yr 0.63 75yr 1.00 99yr 0.23 50yr 0.70 80yr
④non-competitive clause /
compensation clause
no clause stipulated
⑤clause for force majeure no clause stipulated
⑥clause for change in
superior policy and law
no clause stipulated
⑦quality of long term
maintenance and operation
state of the
art
industry
standard
⑧hand-back and/or resale
strictly
stipulated
ordinarily
stipulated
3.70Evaluated Indicator PPI ＝Sum total 4.00 4.63 4.00 3.23
0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0
calculated proportionately
between 35yr（0.0pt）
and 99yr（1.0pt）
0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chicago
Skyway
（2005）
Indiana Toll
Road
（2006）
Pocahontas
Parkway
（2006）
SH-130
5&6
（2008）
I-495 HOT
Lanes
（2008）
 
 
Table 3 tendency of contracts 
2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
PPI
Favorable to
Public Interests
Favorable to
Private Returns
SH-130
I-495
Chicago, Pocahontas
Indiana
 
 
(v) The concession term regulated by the State Law 
varies between 35 and 99 years, depending on 
the State. Accordingly, the term of 35 years is 
scored to be 0.0 pt (most favorable to public 
interests) and the term of 99 years is scored to be 
1.0 pt (most favorable to private returns), and 
others are apportioned by their concession 
length. 
(vi) Thus, all key indicators shall be scored 
independently, and summed up in a total of the 
eight indicators. The sum total is defined as PPI 
(Public-Private Index).  
 
4.2 Results of Scoring 
Table 2 shows the result of the analysis and score 
and Table 3 indicates distribution of the five (5) 
contracts on a straight line showing how they are in 
favor of public interests or private returns.  
Subsequently to the analysis of the US Concession 
contracts, it is found that Indiana Toll Road is scored 
as 4.63 pt and most favorable to private returns. Both 
Chicago Skyway and Pocahontas Parkway that 
scored as 4.00 pt follow it. 
 
In this scoring method, completely private 
returns-favored contract will be scored as 8.0 pt and 
completely public interests-favored contract 0.0 pt. 
However, the scoring shall not necessarily be 
construed that a middle point of 4.0 pt is a totally 
balanced contract. Instead, the scoring finds 
tendency of each contract to be more favorable to 
private returns or public interests. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Several concession contracts carried out in the US 
were discussed and analyzed from a standpoint of 
the private returns and the public interests. As a 
result, following conclusions were obtained; 
 
(i) From a view of the private returns and the 
public interests, eight (8) key indicators were 
enumerated and analyzed in accordance with 
commonly prevailing practice. They were also 
evaluated if they are favorable to private returns or 
public interests and finally scored in a range from 
0.0 pt to 1.0 pt. Conclusively, the scoring method 
verifies whether the contract is either in favor of 
private returns or public interests. 
 
(ii) It was found that key indicators for the 
contract can indicate if the contract is favorable to 
the private returns or the public interests. When the 
scoring is carried out at the bid or the contract in 
future, both concessionaires and public sectors can 
know how intensively their ongoing agreement is 
private returns-favored or public interests-favored. 
 
It is necessary to break down each subject to 
make a more detailed analysis of each key indicator 
and obtain more precise scores. For example, this 
paper scored a contract only based on if 
non-competitive and compensation clause are 
provided or not, but never discussed whether the 
contract should be scored even considering the level 
of compensation. Also, it is planned to expand the 
scope of study into concession contracts in such 
other countries as France and Spain and make 
comparison among multiple countries.     
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